NORDO - Out Of Radio Contact

NORDO is an aviation term referring to an aircraft that is unexpectedly out of radio contact...no radio.  As you might imagine, NORDO has taken on new meaning since the 9/11 terrorist attacks.   Not that it hasn't always been serious, but unusual or non existent radio contact was the first indication controllers working hijacked flights on 9/11 had that something wasn't right.  Few have forgotten that lesson.

A high profile NORDO event occurred in 2009 when Northwest Airlines Flight 188, an Airbus A320, went without radio contact for over 75 minutes.  To make matters worse, the pilots of this flight somehow managed to overfly their destination by 150 miles in spite of all the training, experience and technology available to them. In this case, it was a flight attendant calling the cockpit to find out why they hadn't started to descend who finally clued the cockpit into the fact that they had made a serious error. Both pilots not only lost their jobs, but we're eventually stripped of their pilots licenses by the United States Federal Aviation Administration.

   

The stakes are high in a business where errors in procedure and judgment can and do result in the loss of life.  It's important to learn from our mistakes; but unfortunately, since mistakes commonly result in punishment that could include time off from work, loss of pay and even suspension of revocation of a hard earned license, self-reporting would be rare without a program known as ASAP.

Pilots, dispatchers, mechanics and even flight attendants are invited to participate in a safety reporting program known as the Aviation Safety Action Program or ASAP.  The following is an excerpt from an FAA Advisory Circular published in 2002.  "The objective of ASAP is to encourage air carrier and repair station employees to voluntarily report safety information that may be critical to identifying potential precursors to accidents.  The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has determined that identifying these precursors is essential to further reducing the already low accident rate.  Under an ASAP, safety issues are resolved through corrective action rather than through punishment or discipline.  The ASAP provides for the collection, analysis, and retention of the safety data that is obtained."

The program provides a system for gathering useful data that will be analysed for trending safety issues in exchange for a promise that unintentional mistakes will not be prosecuted.  Air Traffic Controllers have a similar self-reporting system known as ATSAP that works in much the same way. 

I know all this ASAP business is a little dry, but it's important and I'll come back to it.

On a recent flight, I was at the controls while the captain worked the radios and ran checklists. We were on an Air Traffic Control vector to intercept the final approach course in visual flight conditions when the approach controller got busy handling a problem with another aircraft. The other aircraft was returning to the airport with some sort of mechanical problem and was going to land opposite direction from the normal flow of traffic.

I could see the other aircraft, a small single engine Cessna, on the TCAS screen and made a mental note of its position relative to ours. We were about the same distance from the airport as the Cessna, but we were traveling well over twice its speed and would easily beat the small plane to the airport.  We were landing on different, but closely aligned runways and I didn't expect a conflict.

Normally, an approach controller will tell a pilot to call the tower on a specific frequency.  Sometimes the frequency is left out of the instruction, but it's helpful information, especially at an airport with multiple tower frequencies.  "Flight 123, contact tower on frequency 126.55."

As we descended through about 1,500 feet on the approach, I overheard a radio transmission that caught my attention and I realized we had not yet been switched over to the tower frequency.  The captain hadn't picked up on this, so I reminded him that we were still talking to approach.  Normally, if I haven't been switched over to the tower before about 2,000 feet above touchdown, I assume that the controller has forgotten to switch us over and will either transmit a gentle reminder or switch over on my own if the frequency is too congested to get a word in.  In this case, there was far too much confusion and verbal congestion on the approach frequency to request the handoff, so the captain elected to switch over on his own.

By the time we first called the tower, we were descending through 1,000 feet above touchdown.  This is where things got confusing and where we, as the flight crew, made a mistake.

We printed a copy of the ATIS (Automatic Terminal Information Service) about 30 minutes before landing. The ATIS informed us that the tower frequency had changed and provided a new frequency to be used. We made note of the change, but in the heat of the moment, the captain glanced down at his chart and dialed the inactive tower frequency into the #1 Comm radio. He called repeatedly, but the tower was monitoring another frequency and never heard his transmissions. In desperation, he tried the ground control and clearance delivery frequencies listed on the chart but for reasons unknown did not get an answer on those frequencies either.

By this point, we were descending through 300 feet above touchdown without a landing clearance. I considered going around, but then I remembered the Cessna.  I glanced at the TCAS and noted that the Cessna was now about three miles out and still appeared to be landing opposite direction. A go-around would have put us nose to nose...most likely with no radio contact. I visually scanned the runway and the taxiways around the runway and determined that the area was clear of traffic.  I told the captain that I intended to land unless he instructed me to go-around.  But before he could respond I glanced at the tower and noticed the green light.

Oddly enough, I had attended the annual AirVenture fly-in aviation convention in Oshkosh, Wisconsin just weeks earlier. I walked through the FAA's exhibit while I was there and happened to pick up a sticker entitled "Air Traffic Control - Light Gun Signals."  I placed the sticker, with no intention of ever needing it, inside the front cover of my Jepps binder.  I remembered that the signal for "cleared to land" was a solid green light. To be honest, this was information that I hadn't reviewed in many years.  The tower controller was watching.  He knew we were out of radio contact.  And he was using a light gun to clear us to land.

I almost missed the signal. It was dim and difficult to see and certainly would not have caught my attention if I had not looked directly at the tower, but it was the clearance we needed. As we passed through 50 feet above touchdown I started to reduce thrust, pulled slightly on the yoke and set the aircraft softly onto the runway. It's funny how clear things seem in hindsight   It wasn't until after touchdown that I realized what we had done.

Ugh...that sinking feeling in the pit of your gut.  No one likes to make mistakes, but I think pilots as a group are harder on themselves than most.  I think its just part of being a professional...we demand the best of ourselves at all times.

I'm about to get back to that ASAP thing...

Realizing our mistake, I reminded the captain about the frequency change and he made contact with the tower. I appreciated the kind words and reassuring tone from the controller...and I got the impression we hadn't been the first to make that particular error.  "No harm no foul" he said.  We asked if the ground and clearance frequencies were monitored and he indicated that they were.  I'm not sure why we hadn't been able to make contact on the other two frequencies.

After we completed the parking checklist, I called the tower on my cell phone and spoke to the controller who had worked our flight. The guy was understanding and affirmed our decision not to go-around.  I think the idea of us going nose to nose with the Cessna while unable to communicate scared him at least as much as it scared me.  He made it clear that the light gun signal was a legal clearance to land.  No violation would be filed.

I feel I should add this note about the phone call.  While I've done it a number of times, I have been told by people on the inside that a phone call to the tower could potentially lead to negative results.  Sometimes, especially at large airports, the phone may be answered by a supervisor, not the controller who worked your flight.  It is possible that the supervisor might not agree with the controller's assessment, so you could be outing yourself with the phone call.  Be careful out there folks, there are ample opportunities to make your life more complicated than it needs to be.

Now back to ASAP...

The stated purpose of the ASAP program is to learn from the errors we will inevitably make, and to improve the already increasingly safe skies over the United States.

As unfortunate as it may be, the word from an air traffic controller or Federal Inspector can't always be taken at face value.  It may not be intentional, but for a number of reasons, the decision to file a violation against a crew may be out of the hands of a well intentioned controller like the one I described here.  I'm sure he had no intention of reporting the event, but there are internal and external reviews in place that could override that decision.

For that reason, even though I still believe we had a legal landing clearance, I elected to file an ASAP report.  Unfortunately for the pilots of Northwest flight 188, the ASAP report did not save them from an inevitable outcome.  Personally, I disagree with that decision, but their mistake was too great and too public to be overlooked.  Mine on the other hand was quietly accepted into the program.  The event has by now been "collected, analysed, and retained" and will be tracked for a possible trend.

Hopefully, I won't be the only person who learns from my mistake.

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"When you land...please call this number"

I got the dreaded call this week, "When you land...please call this number."  For those of you who don't fly, I'm not sure how to accurately describe the feeling pilots get when they hear those words.  I rank this phrase right up there with "say your altitude."  Simple words that strike fear into any aviator.  For me there was an immediate uneasiness in my stomach as I perused my memory of the last hour of flight.

"A pilot lives in a world of perfection, or not at all"

-- Richard S. Drury, "My Secret War"

We departed Palm Springs, California an hour earlier and were cruising at 31,000 feet when Los Angeles Center gave us a phone number and instructions to call SOCAL TRACON after we landed.  SOCAL TRACON is an acronym for Southern California Terminal Radar Approach Control, which controls most traffic in and out of southern California airports.  I immediately knew what they wanted to discuss and knew I had not violated any FAR's, but I still felt slightly uneasy...a little like that feeling you get when a policeman is following you on the highway.  You know you're driving under the limit, your tags and inspections are up to date, but it still makes you uncomfortable to have him back there.

Before we left Palm Springs, I contacted "Clearance Delivery" who issued our en-route clearance.  We were instructed to fly the CATHEDRAL ONE DEPARTURE (CATH1.PSP) V370 TNP then as filed.  Take a look at the departure below.  Departing runway 31L, the procedure called for us to climb on an initial heading of 310 degrees until passing  the Palm Springs 268 degree radial, followed by a right turn direct to the Palm Springs VOR.  After passing the Palm Springs VOR, we would fly the PSP 104 degree radial until passing the EMRUD intersection, then make a right turn direct to PSP.  Confused yet?  The procedure also requires pilots to cross PSP the second time at 6,200 feet before proceeding to the northeast on V370.  Terrain around the airport necessitates these turns, providing more distance to climb above surrounding mountains before venturing away from the security of the valley surrounding the airport.

CATHEDRAL ONE DEPARTURE - Palm Springs, California

Palm Springs International, looking west past the passenger terminal.

I jotted down the clearance on our flight plan then loaded the route into the FMS.  The CATHEDRAL ONE is not an RNAV departure, but I intended to use the FMS to guide us along the route.  An important part of the pre-flight process is the route check.  After I loaded the route into the FMS, the Captain checked my entries as I read from the clearance and the flight plan.  It is standard procedure at most airlines for one pilot to load the FMS and for the other pilot to check his work.

Here's an unrelated video that shows how to load the FMS (also known as the GFMS on this jet).

It was at this point that I noticed a discrepancy between what was depicted on the chart verses what appeared in our FMS.  I took the picture below while sitting at the gate before push back and engine start.  See if you can see the difference.  Take a look at the departure procedure and decide which way you would turn after EMRUD.  Now take a look at what the FMS instructed us to do.  After EMRUD, the chart shows a right turn and the FMS shows a turn to the left.  

The terrain I was most concerned about was west of the airport, so I was surprised that the procedure called for a turn toward the mountains.  But regardless of what seemed right or logical, I wanted to know what ATC was expecting us to do.  Here's where things got a little more confusing.  I asked PSP Clearance to find out which way they expected us to turn after EMRUD.  His response?  "I would expect you to turn left.  There are mountains to the right."  Well, now I was really confused.

After some time and a promise that he would check into the matter, clearance confirmed that the chart was correct.  A right turn didn't seem logical, but that's what the procedure instructed us to do.  The whole thing was a moot point, since we were able to climb fast enough that the teardrop turn after PSP was not necessary.  Even with a fully loaded jet, we were able to climb well above the 6,200 foot restriction and were almost immediately cleared on course.  The picture below is our actual flight path.

An hour into the flight, someone a little higher up in the chain of command at SOCAL got involved and wanted more information.  Thankfully, the ass chewing that usually goes with "call us when you land" wasn't going to happen today.  The moral of the story is to check your FMS or GPS or whatever it is you are using.  Don't assume the data in your device is correct.  Don't assume the guy on the other end of the radio knows the procedure.  Safety is everything...trust but verify.  

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Close Call

The picture above is Pacific Southwest Airlines (PSA) flight 182, a Boeing 727, after a mid-air collision with a Cessna 172 over San Diego, California on September 25, 1978. PSA 182 was on a downwind leg for runway 27 at the same time that the 172, N7711G, was flying a practice ILS approach to runway 9. After the impact, both aircraft crashed, killing a total of 144 people…135 passengers and crew aboard PSA 182, a student and his instructor in the 172 and 7 people including 2 children on the ground. An additional 9 people on the ground were injured and 22 homes were destroyed.

This accident and other similar incidents gave impetus to the creation of such technology as the Traffic Collision Avoidance System (TCAS), policies like those requiring altitude reporting transponders while inside the airspace surrounding major airports and procedures inside the cockpit and within air traffic control centers that would help prevent such disasters from occurring in the future.

Since it relates specifically to the story I’m about to tell, let me provide a short explanation of TCAS.

The picture above is a good representation of a typical TCAS display. TCAS involves communication between all aircraft equipped with an appropriate transponder (provided the transponder is enabled and set up properly). Each TCAS-equipped aircraft "interrogates" all other aircraft in a determined range about their position, and all other craft reply to other interrogations. This interrogation-and-response cycle may occur several times per second.

Through this constant back-and-forth communication, the TCAS system builds a three dimensional map of aircraft in the airspace, incorporating their bearing, altitude and range. Then, by extrapolating current range and altitude difference to anticipated future values, it determines if a potential collision threat exists.

The next step beyond identifying potential collisions is automatically negotiating a mutual avoidance maneuver (currently, maneuvers are restricted to changes in altitude and modification of climb/sink rates) between the two (or more) conflicting aircraft. These avoidance maneuvers are communicated to the flight crew by a cockpit display and by synthesized voice instructions.

In basic terms, if I am sharing airspace with an aircraft that is not equipped with TCAS, the TCAS onboard my aircraft will tell me to climb or descend to avoid a collision. If I am sharing airspace with an aircraft equipped with TCAS, the systems onboard my aircraft will communicated and coordinate with the other aircraft and our respective TCAS systems will provide instructions to climb or descend to avoid a conflict.

So here we go…Ontario, California to Dallas - Ft. Worth, Texas on a crisp, cool Saturday afternoon in November. We were planning to have a few open seats on our flight home, but non-revs and last minute travelers seem to come out of the woodwork at the last minute and we managed to leave full. We left the gate a few minutes ahead of schedule and began the short taxi to runway 26R for takeoff as I briefed the Captain on the final weight and balance information and ran the taxi and before takeoff checklists.

The departure procedure out of Ontario is far from the most complicated we fly, but it can be a challenge for a few reasons. First, Ontario has a noise abatement procedure that is put in place to minimize the impact of noise pollution in the area surrounding the airport. The MD80 that I fly is not exactly known for it’s quiet engines and is notorious for setting off noise sensors when the procedure is not followed correctly. They don’t just issue the procedure and ask us to fly as quietly as possible, they actually listen.

Many airports around the country have installed noise sensors in the neighborhoods surrounding major airports. If the pilots exceed the allowable decibel level on one of these sensors, the airline is fined. In this case, the procedure calls for an early left turn with the flaps and slats extended to allow for a sharper turn and a reduction from takeoff to climb power at a lower than normal altitude. By itself, not a huge deal.

The procedure is further complicated by the routing and altitude requirements on the SID (Standard Instrument Departure). After liftoff, we are required to make an early and sharp turn to the southeast and proceed directly to the Paradise VOR. Once direct to Paradise, we must be careful to cross 6 miles from the VOR at or below 4000 feet and then cross over the VOR at or above 2700. We then cross the next fix between 4500 and 9000, the next fix at or below 11000 and the fix after that above 6000. It’s all very confusing and a lot to think about in the first few minutes of the flight, especially when you consider the pilots are also retracting gear and flaps, accelerating to 250 knots, running the after takeoff checklists and watching for traffic.

Traffic. It’s that last little thing that has the potential to make this departure so interesting. Southern California and specifically the LA basin hosts a significant number of small, general aviation aircraft sharing the same airspace as large jets easily operating 2-3 times their speed. The LA basin is also home to a number of major airports…LAX, ONT, BUR, LGB and SNA…to name a few. The combination of large jets and small general aviation aircraft operating in significant numbers in a relatively small geographic area makes the possibility of disaster is a very real concern.

I was flying, so after receiving our takeoff clearance, I pushed the throttles up to stabilize the engines, then called for “auto throttle” and allowed the automatic system to set takeoff thrust. We accelerated normally down the runway and the Captain called out V1, Rotate and we were airborne. As we climbed through 100 feet, we received our first traffic advisory from the tower. I don’t know exactly what was going on in the controllers mind at the time…maybe he was distracted by something else…maybe he was previously unaware of the traffic, but I can tell you that 100 feet is an extremely unusual time to receive a traffic advisory. There was a helicopter two miles west of the airport heading east at 1000 feet. That put him directly in front of us, heading right at us, at an altitude we were going to climb through very shortly. Our TCAS called out an audible warning “Traffic, Traffic” to warn us of the target and displayed a solid white diamond shape on the TCAS display that immediately became an amber circle, indicating the increasingly close proximity of the traffic. I elected to begin the turn as depicted on the departure procedure and increased our rate of climb to clear the traffic as soon as possible. As we passed through 800 feet the TCAS once again sounded…this time with the words “Climb, Climb” as the amber circle became a red square and a green arc appeared on the VSI (Vertical Speed Indicator) indicating the rate of climb needed to resolve the event. We continued our turn and climbed as fast as we could with the nose well above the 20 degrees. We safely passed through 1000 feet and could see the helicopter clearly as he passed behind us…much closer than I would have liked. Then as we passed through 1500 feet and were moving away from the target, the TCAS made it’s final announcement… “Clear of Conflict” and the event was over. No more than 20 seconds had elapsed since rotation.

As we continued to climb, we shifted our attention to completing the after takeoff checklist and monitoring the various altitude restrictions on the departure. Approaching the JUMPA intersection, so named for parachute jumping activity in the area (another target to watch for and a story for another day) we received another traffic advisory from ATC. As we passed through 9,000 feet climbing at about 2000 feet per minute, ATC advised us of opposite direction traffic ahead at 10,500 feet. “Advise you stop climb until passing traffic” we were told. I had already started to push the nose over before receiving the instruction and we level off at 10,000 feet just before the TCAS announced “Traffic, Traffic”. By the time I looked down at the TCAS, the target was already a red square on the display and we received our second Resolution Advisory of the day as the TCAS announced “monitor vertical speed” and a green arc illuminated on the VSI indicating that we should maintain level flight or descend to avoid the target.

Level at 10,000 we visually acquired the traffic ahead, a twin engine Cessna 421. As the traffic passed by, the TCAS announced “clear of conflict” once again and two other targets appeared on the TCAS screen, both below us, one crossing right to left and the other crossing left to right, both less than 1000 feet below us. I wondered if they were aware of each other. With the overhead traffic now behind us, we happily continued our climb out of what is almost always a very busy environment on a nice Saturday afternoon. Once above 18,000 we were once again in no man’s land for small planes enjoying visual flight and could once again relax a bit.

Clearly, TCAS was a tremendously important tool to us on this flight. The ATC controller watching over our flight was responsible for separating us from other traffic in the area, the Captain and I were also responsible for separation and were paying close attention to local traffic, and I’m sure the other pilots involved were as well. That said, TCAS provided a level of safety and protection for our flight that was not available in 1978. With respect to the PSA accident over San Diego, TCAS would almost certainly have prevented the collision. While I am saddened by the fact that it took a death count to bring about this change, I am hopeful that those who lost loved ones in this accident and other like it gain some solace in knowing that the death of those they cared for may very likely have saved the lives of thousands.

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Medical Emergency

I was responding to our instructions to “Descend now, cross MOOSE at FL 240” when I heard the cabin emergency signal. I turned up the volume on the intercom in time to hear one of the flight attendants in the back alerting the others that we had a passenger in distress near the last row. A man in his 40’s had lost consciousness after standing near his seat and hit his head on the way to the floor. One of the flight attendants tried to break his fall, but was injured in the process. The captain instructed me to declare a medical emergency and handle the flying and ATC communications while he took over coordination with the flight attendants and our company dispatch.

As we learned later from exiting passengers, the flight attendants were doing an excellent job with their patient and were both calm and collected as they performed life saving duties. They are trained for this sort of thing, but situations like this are uncommon. Normally, the flight attendants are seen passing out drinks and trying to make everyone’s flight a little more comfortable, but they are trained for much more. Even on a routine flight, they perform many safety related duties that are not recognized by the average traveler, but when called upon in an emergency, they are invaluable.

In the cockpit, it seemed like the interphone chime sounded a hundred times in the 15 minutes it took us to get on the ground. Every time there was a change in the passenger’s condition, we were notified. The Captain was in constant contact with the flight attendants, company dispatch, and the “on-call physician” available to us via phone patch. Passenger condition, medical history, medications…everything was important. You never know how these things are going to turn out and I've seen them go both ways…but you have to assume and prepare for the worst. Sometimes you do everything in your power to get what you think is a dying passenger on the ground only to have them walk off the jet in seemingly perfect health. Other times, it’s the real deal and a life is in the balance.

Once I uttered the word “emergency” to ATC, we were immediately cleared direct to our destination and others in our path were given vectors to clear the way. I increased our speed to Mach .80 and transitioned to 330 knots. As far as the flying was concerned, everything we were doing felt out of the norm, so I had to be very careful to plan my descent and speed reduction to avoid any mistakes. I wanted to fly as fast as possible and delay my speed reduction as late as I could, but had to plan carefully, and when it came to the approach, flew normal speeds and utilized standard procedures in order to insure the safety of all those on board. We had our choice of runways and were cleared direct to the outer marker from about 80 miles out. As we broke out of the clouds at about 1000 ft, we could see that there was a line of planes awaiting our arrival. All departures were suspended as we approached the airport to insure there would be no delays for our flight.

After landing, the tower cleared us directly to our gate where paramedics, passenger service personnel and a ground crew were ready and waiting. As we approached the gate, I asked our passengers to remain seated until the paramedics had entered the aircraft and assessed the situation. Thankfully for all involved, this situation ended well. The ill passenger was removed from the aircraft and taken to the hospital where he was treated and released. The injured flight attendant had a bruised hand and will recover fully. To be honest, the whole thing was a little anti-climactic. After we arrived at the gate, my job was essentially over. It seemed like there should be more for me to do, but there wasn’t. I thanked everyone involved, packed up my bags and headed for home.

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