Return to Base

I had one of those days on Saturday that started early, went bad fast and only got worse as the day went on.   One of those rare days when nothing seems to go right and in spite of great efforts to the contrary, everyone involved leaves dissatisfied and determined to utilize another airline for future travel. 

I signed in at 5am for the third day of a three day trip.  Go home day.  The day when everyone desperately hopes for smooth travel and an on time or early return to base.  We were scheduled for three legs, over 7 hours of flight time and 11 hours on duty.  We ended the day with closer to 9 hours of actual flight time and 14 hours on duty.  A long day by any measure.

Leg number one went as planned.  Our early morning departure out of Colorado necessitated de-icing and an extra cup of coffee, but we left the gate ahead of schedule and landed at our destination 15 minutes early.  One down, two to go.  We were originally scheduled to keep the same aircraft all day and even had the same flight number for the first and second leg, but upon arrival after leg number one we were informed that we would be changing aircraft before our next departure. 

Swapping planes…the bag drag…adds more trouble and complication to a crew’s day than you might think.  Pilots and Flight Attendants alike build what is often called a “nest” in the aircraft.  Bags, books, checklists, headsets and everything else in its proper place takes time and effort.  We all hate changing airplanes especially when you’re already on one that’s working properly.  I can’t tell you how many times I’ve swapped to a new jet only to find that the new one is late, broken or both.  In this case, our original jet was working fine, our nests were built and dragging our bags from one end of the airport to the other was only going to add to the fatigue of an already long day.

As I began to settle into my new work space, one of my first actions was to check the aircraft logbook.  This is where the day started to go south.  An aircraft, especially a large jet, is a complicated piece of machinery and it’s not uncommon for things not to work properly.  There are multiple backups for all important systems and for the most part, the passengers on board are almost always oblivious to malfunctions.  This particular aircraft had been written up the day before for problems with a landing gear indicator light, an anti-skid issue and a problem with the automatic spoilers.  What we like to see as pilots is a balancing entry in the logbook that shows corrective action to repair the issue.  What we do not like to see in the logbook are the words “unable to duplicate, ok for service.”  Guess what was written in my logbook.

The jet had been flown since these words were added to the aircraft logbook, so I was hopeful that the issues had been resolved.  Sometimes, an airplane is a little like your home computer.  Turn everything off, remove all power and reboot…you’d be surprised how often that works. 

We pushed back from the gate on time, taxied out for takeoff and were almost to the runway before we had our first sign of trouble.  As we approached the runway, I was working through the Before Takeoff Checklist and was unable to arm the auto-brakes.  (In the event of an aborted takeoff, auto-brakes will engage the brakes automatically to help slow the aircraft)  Then I noticed that all four anti-skid inop lights were illuminated on the overhead panel.  We stopped the aircraft, worked through our checklists and were able to reset the system and extinguish the warning lights.  Problem solved, cleared for takeoff.

It was my leg, and as I climbed through about 5000 feet the Captain noticed the left main landing gear unsafe light was illuminated.  This light indicates the landing gear is not in agreement with the landing gear handle.  In this case, the light indicated that the left main gear was not all the way up and locked.  We decided to continue climbing while we ran the checklist.  About the time the Captain had started running the checklist, the landing gear door light illuminated.  This aircraft has gear doors that open to allow the gear to raise and lower and are always closed when the landing gear is either all the way up or all the way down.  The light was an indication that the door was open.  A little or a lot, we did not know. 

I turned the auto-pilot off and flew the aircraft by hand for a while hoping to detect some unusual control inputs that would help determine if the lights were correct.  It was a possibility that both the lights were in error and that the gear was up and the door was closed.  One step in the procedure was to turn the hydraulic system from low to high pressure to ensure sufficient pressure was available to raise the gear and secure the doors.  As we turned the engine-driven hydraulic pumps from low to high, we heard and felt a loud kathunk as the some portion of the gear or gear doors found their correct place and the warning lights went out.

Just about this time, I looked up at the overhead annunciator panel and noticed that the “Auto Spoiler Do Not Use” light was illuminated.  So here we were, no more than 10 minutes into the flight and all three previously noted issues had resurfaced.

After working through the various checklist procedures, were able to correct the issue with the landing gear.  The anti-skid issue was rectified on the ground, but the circuitry would not allow testing of this system while airborne with the gear up…so we really didn’t know if it would work upon arrival.  The only issue we were unable to address was the auto spoiler, which could be deployed manually upon landing.  No big deal.

We continued on course and climbed to cruise altitude as we continued to discuss the possible outcomes of what had occurred thus far.  The aircraft was safe to fly and could easily, safely and legally be landed even if all three of these problems resurfaced, so the immediate decision was made to continue on to our scheduled destination.  However, it occurred to us that the aircraft would have to be written up after we landed and might not be able to be fixed at an outstation.  To complicate matters, we were en-route to a destination outside of the United States where maintenance was going to be difficult to arrange.  If we continued and landed at our destination, it was highly probable that our return flight would cancel and we would spend the night.

Selfishly…we were en-route to a beach destination in Mexico where our all-inclusive hotel sits only steps from the ocean.  Spending the night would not have been a bad thing.  We decided that this decision should be made by someone else and called home to ask Mom.  Our aircraft is equipped with a phone that utilizes the aircraft’s on board Wi-Fi signal to place calls.  We dialed the number and in seconds were having a phone conversation with company dispatch.

Quoting company policy to continue the flight if the aircraft is in safe and airworthy condition, we were initially instructed to continue.  The idea is to get one plane load of passengers where they want to be and inconvenience the return group instead of both plane loads of customers. 

About ten minutes later, we received a message from the company that they had changed their mind and wanted us back home.  Apparently there were no facilities in place at our destination to repair the aircraft and they didn’t want to strand us and more importantly the jet at an outstation in Mexico.  I started a slow 180 degree turn to the right as the Captain picked up the PA and started to explain.  He offered to let me make that PA, but I declined.  We were 45 minutes into our flight at this point and even with a strong tailwind the ride home seemed like an eternity.

I was impressed with how the company handled our return.  This flight had become what is often called an OSO, or an off scheduled operation, and OSO’s are prone to falling into cracks.  We arrived back at home base and were assigned a gate next to the aircraft we were to turn around take back out.  The jet needed to be cleaned, fueled, catered and all necessary paperwork had to be re-calculated, re-filed and re-printed.  There were plenty of opportunities for something to get missed, but everyone did their job and we were back on the road in a surprisingly short time.

The rest of the trip was uneventful…just long.  I’m off to recurrent training next for my yearly refresher course.  Saturday was a good day of practice.

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Down Three Red

Waiting in line for takeoff from San Diego 

San Diego has a noise curfew that prohibits takeoff before 6:30am.  No need to set an alarm clock if you live off the west end of the runway as the first MD80 departure of the day could wake the dead.  Most of the airlines push off the gate around 6:15 taxi down and wait for the clock to click past 6:29.  As you can see from the picture, my flight was about number 5 in line this morning...we rotated at 6:36.

It was a beautiful southern California morning with good visibility, warm temperatures and light winds.  I landed almost three hours later in Dallas, Texas where the temperature was hovering around 40 degrees Fahrenheit with cloud bases at 300 feet and visibility described in feet, not miles.  I was at the controls as Regional Approach vectored us in for an ILS approach to runway 36L.  "Turn left heading 030, maintain 4000 until established, cleared for the ILS 36L."

The visibility wasn't great, but it was a simple approach with enough room between minimums and the actual weather conditions that I was confident we would land.  I left the auto pilot engaged as we intercepted the glide slope and began our final descent.  We were in icing conditions with engine and wing heat on and I needed to keep the engines spooled up to provide enough heat to keep the wings warm, so I lowered the flaps earlier than normal and asked the Captain to lower the gear as we descended through 1800 feet AGL.  I heard the nose gear doors open and felt the mains drop into position, but in my peripheral vision I could see the glaring red lights indicating a gear unsafe condition...

In hind sight, what surprises me most about what happened next was how much information passed though my head in such a short amount of time.  It was only after we were safely on the ground and the Captain and I began to talk about what had happened that we realized how much we had considered in such a short period.

...I felt the gear fall into place and was reasonable sure at least one of the three landing gear was down...three red lights on the panel indicate none of the three gear is down and locked...did I forget to turn the hydraulic pumps on high?  No, both engine driven hydraulic pumps were selected to high...check the nose gear indicating pin...it's up indicating the nose gear is down, but the light still shines red...cycle the gear?  Maybe we'll get lucky...1600 AGL now, precious little time to salvage a landing...bingo fuel is 9,400 lbs. and we're at 10,800 right now...not enough for a go around and another attempt...what's my alternate airport...visibility is too low to ask the tower for a visual check on the gear...

As those last few thoughts were passing through my head the Captain lowered the gear handle a second time and in a few seconds we had three green lights.  Clearly the situation was much improved, but I still had work to do.  I was behind now and needed to be fully configured by 1000 feet AGL or our company procedures would require a go-around.  I lowered the rest of the flaps and slowed the aircraft to approach speed and managed to stabilize the thrust as the aircraft announced "1000."  The surface report that I had rechecked only minutes earlier claimed a ceiling of 700 feet and visibility of 1 1/2 miles.  But as we passed through 700 ft, the rain that had been falling lightly for a few minutes now intensified and it was clear the weather was lower than reported.

The Captain reported the runway lights as we descended through 300 feet and called the runway in sight at 200 feet above touchdown.  As the mains contacted the runway, the tower controller reported runway visibility of 5000RVR.  I slowed the aircraft to taxi speed and stepped on the right rudder to steer toward the high speed exit and noticed my heart rate...slightly elevated to say the least.

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Why Does American Airlines Paint its Tails Gray?

The question
A friend and fellow aviation geek recently asked me why American Airlines paints the tails of its aircraft gray.  "I understand why panels constructed of composite materials would need to be painted, but I can't imagine that's why, for example, the MD80 tails are painted gray.  So the question is...why does AA paint its tails gray?  Thanks."

The answer:
The history on this is a bit foggy, but here's the best I can piece together in a short time.  The tails of all jets at American Airlines were, once upon a time, polished.  As the most common member of the American Airlines fleet, you have most likely seen the polished skin of an MD80 as it taxied or flew by.  You probably had your hands over your ears at the time as the MD80 isn't exactly the quietest member of the AA fleet.  Maybe you noticed, maybe you didn't, but the tail section and certain other parts of American's jets are currently painted gray.  There was a time, however, that even the tail sections of American's jets were a combination of paint and polish.  Access panels, trim tabs and fairings were painted gray and other sections of the tail were polished in the same manner as the fuselage.

American Airlines Airbus A300 in the New Mexico desert

Some fleet types at American have large composite sections that require painting.  For instance, the nose section of American's now retired Airbus A300 fleet was composite and required a layer of paint.  I'm not referring to the nose cone which is always painted, but the section over the cockpit windows.

In the end, the decision to paint the metal on the tail was designed to protect the surfaces, to provide a fleet-wide common livery and to reduce the cluttered look that resulted from painting some, but not all of the tail.

Here's an example of the change.  The picture below shows ship 223 (N223AA) in 1989 with a polished tail.

The picture below shows the same aircraft with a painted tail in August of 2009, after I delivered it to its final resting place in the desert outside Roswell, New Mexico.

I've shared the link before, but in case you haven't seen it, here is a video I made after the last flight of N223AA.

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An Insider’s View of the AMR Bankruptcy

Working for a bankrupt airline is not where I thought I would be 12 years ago when I took this job.  I came to a crossroad in 1999, standing in my living room staring at an answering machine with two blinking messages.  One from American Airlines and the other from cross town rival Southwest.  These were my top two choices.  Dream jobs.  Winning the lottery wouldn’t have seemed any more of a distant possibility.  I was honestly amazed and bewildered by the decision I was about to make.

In the end I took the job at American with high hopes of a quick upgrade to Captain and dreams of retiring as a senior B777 Captain.  At the time I was hired, my retirement seniority number was projected to be a two digit number, pretty amazing stuff at a major airline with over 10,000 pilots.

Twelve years later things haven’t worked out exactly as planned.  Various circumstances with which I will not expand upon have resulted in one basic truth.  12 years ago I was a junior First Officer on the MD80 and today I find myself in the exact same position.  12 years ago I was all full of hope, excited about the future, proud to wear the uniform.  Today I wonder if I will have a job next month.  I wonder if I will have to sell my house.  I’m thankful that I don’t have a car payment and I’m thankful that I have money in savings, although not enough, for my daughter’s college education.  The future is anything but secure.

Let’s take just a moment to recognize the elephant in the room.  New reports abound with stories blaming the employees of American Airlines for the demise of a once great airline.  Specifically to blame are the pilots.  After all, they are the highest paid labor group on the property.  No doubt you have read about the pilots refusing to accept a contract offer from management that would have guaranteed pay raises and promised growth and prosperity for the airline.  The airline said it, so it must be true.  Hogwash.

Has everyone forgotten 2003?  Ok, ok, unless you worked for the airline or were directly impacted you probably didn’t pay much attention then much less remember the details now.  In 2003 the employees of American Airlines came to the company’s rescue and voluntarily accepted huge pay cuts and reductions in benefits.  The often quoted mantra from company back then was “Pull together, win together.” 

All told, the labor concessions at American Airlines totaled over $1.8 billion.  The pilots alone agreed to cuts that, in management’s estimate, equaled roughly $660 million in annual savings for the company.  Did you catch the word “annual” in that sentence?  The pilot’s union claimed a much larger number and the truth most likely lies somewhere in between.  Pull together, win together?  These savings were in jeopardy of falling apart after retention bonuses and pension protection for executives were revealed on the last day most employees were voting on the cuts, but the labor force at American took the high road and saved the company from bankruptcy. 

The improvements gained by American Airlines in 2003 gave the company an enormous cost advantage over its rivals.  But instead of using this new found leverage to compete soundly with its competitors, American Airlines shrunk.  In 2003 when the new contracts were inked, American Airlines employed over 13,500 pilots.  Today they employ fewer than 8,000.  They sold airplanes, cut routes and unveiled a corporate pay and bonus structure that rewarded top executives with multi-million dollar enhancements based on stock price as compared with its rivals.  Of course, you would think as poorly as the airline has performed, that bonuses would not be paid…but you would be wrong.  Last year, American ranked last when compared with its competitors, but the bonuses still flowed by the millions.

Back to the contract “turned down” by the pilots last month.  First, the by-laws at the Allied Pilots Association require any Tentative Agreement (T/A) to be in contractual language before it can be voted upon.  Management knows this and the agreement tendered by American was basically a bullet point summary.  Second, any agreement deemed acceptable by the APA negotiating committee must be studied for seven days before the agreement can be offered to the pilot group to be voted upon.  Third, and quite telling, is the fact that management inserted hot button items into the agreement that they knew full well would result in it being voted down.

Specifically, I’m referring to domestic code-share.  American Airlines has an agreement with its pilots that reads as follows: 

“All flying performed by the Company, a subsidiary, or affiliate directly or indirectly controlled by the Company, or successor in interest, or flying performed on behalf of the Company as a result of any agreement to which the Company is a party or becomes a party, shall be performed by pilots named on the active American Airlines Pilots Seniority List.”

This agreement, commonly referred to as a scope clause, prohibits the airline’s use of pilots from another carrier.  It’s all about job protection.

Over the past 25 years, the pilots of American Airlines have allowed exceptions to this agreement to allow feed operations in domestic markets by its regional partners (mainly American Eagle) and with its international partner airlines (there are many) in overseas markets not served by American Airlines.

However, over the last 10 years alone, American Airlines has shrunk by almost 30% while its domestic code-share partner American Eagle has grown by the same amount.  American Airlines now wants its pilots to allow the airline to sell tickets out of New York, Boston and Washington DC on other airlines, reducing or eliminating the need for American Airlines pilots in these markets.  All markets served by American Airlines.  All markets where the airline operates crew bases and its pilots and flight attendants call home. 

American Airlines never expected their offer to the pilots to be accepted.  It was part of a plan that was set in motion long before the company filed for bankruptcy on November 29^th.  Look at what happened on day one of the AMR bankruptcy.  President and CEO Gerard Arpey announced his new job at the helm of investment firm Emerald Creek Group, founded by former Continental CEO Larry Kellner.  Several new websites were launched.  Hundreds of pages of documents were filed.  So on and so forth.  A plan was made public that had been set in motion months before.  The agreement pushed across the table to the pilots was all part of that plan.

It’s all water under the bridge at this point.  The truth is that the employees at American Airlines are under fire. They are outnumbered and low on ammunition with no backup in sight.  Need someone to blame?  Point your finger somewhere else.

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In Their Own Words

Once you get hooked on the airline business, it's worse than dope.
- Ed Acker, PAA CEO while Chairman of Air Florida

 

 

 

 

 

These days no one can make money on the goddamn airline business. The economics represent sheer hell.
- C. R. Smith, Founder & President of American Airlines.

 

 

  

 

 

 

 A recession is when you have to tighten your belt; depression is when you have no belt to tighten. When you've lost your trousers - you're in the airline business.
- Sir Adam Thomson Founder British Caledonian Airways

 

 

 

 

 

 

If the pilots were in charge, Columbus would still be in port. They believe the assertion that the world is flat.
- Robert L. Crandall while CEO American Airlines

 

 

 

 

 

 

 If the Wright brother were alive today Wilbur would have to fire Orville to reduce costs.
- Herb Kelleher, Southwest Airlines, ' USA Today June 8 1994

 

 

 

 

 

 

If we went into the funeral business, people would stop dying.
- Martin R. Shugrue, Vice-chairman Pan Am.

 

The greatest sin of airline management of the last 22 years is to say, "It's all labor's fault."
- Donald Carty, Chairman and CEO American Airlines 2002.

 

 

 

 

 

 

There are only two reasons to sit in the back row of an airplane:
   Either you have diarrhea, or you're anxious to meet people who do..
- Henry Kissinger

 

 

 

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A Brief History of the DC-9/MD80 Series Aircraft

The DC-9:

• July 1921:  The Douglas Aircraft Company was founded by Donald Wills Douglas, Sr. in Santa Monica, California.  He served as President from 1921 to 1957, Chairman of the Board from 1957 to 1967 and Honorary Chairman of the Board from 1967 to 1981.
• July 1939:  The McDonnell Aircraft Corporation was founded by James Smith McDonnell and operated next to Lambert Field in St. Louis, Missouri.  He served as President of McDonnell from 1939 to 1962, President and CEO from 1962 to 1967.  At McDonnell Douglas he served as Chairman of the board and CEO from 1967 to 1972 and Chairman of the Board from 1972 to 1980.
• The two companies did not merge until April of 1967.
• April 8, 1963:  The Douglas DC-9 was launched with no orders on the books.

• April 25, 1963:  Delta Air Lines placed the first DC-9 order for 15 aircraft with options for an additional 15.
• February 25, 1965:  First flight of the DC-9-10 twinjet airliner.
• November 23, 1965: FAA certification granted for the DC-9-10.
• December 8, 1965:  The DC-9-10 enters service with Delta Air Lines.

• August 1, 1966:  First flight of the DC-9-30.
• December 1966:  DC-9-20 announced.  The DC-9 series 20, although numbered second in the sequence of models, was actually the fourth member of the family.
• February 1, 1967:  DC-9-30 enters service with Eastern Airlines.

• April 28, 1967:  The McDonnell and Douglas companies merge to form the McDonnell Douglas Corporation with headquarters in St. Louis, Missouri.
• November 28, 1967:  First flight of the DC-9-40.
• March 12, 1968:  DC-9-40 enters service with SAS.

• September 18, 1968:  First flight of the DC-9-20.
• December 1968:  First DC-9-20 delivered to SAS.
• Mid 1973:  DC-9-50 announced.
• December 17, 1974:  First flight of the DC-9-50.
• August 1975:  DC-9-50 enters service with swissair.

• October 1982:  Final DC-9 delivered.

• Total Aircraft built:

o   DC-9-10:  137

o   DC-9-20:  10

o   DC-9-30:  662

o   DC-9-40:  71

o   DC-9-50:  96

·         Douglas and McDonnell Douglas produced 976 DC-9s from 1965 to 1982.

The MD-80:

  

• October 1977:  The DC-9-80 was launched.  The aircraft was initially known as the DC-9-55 and later as the DC-9-80…the Super 80.
• October 24, 1978:  President Carter signed the Airline Deregulation Act.  The act became Public Law 95-504.
• October 18, 1979:  First flight of the DC-9-80.
• May 2, 1980:  During certification testing, the first DC-9-80 built (N980DC) breaks apart upon landing on runway 22 at Edwards Air Force Base.  The aircraft was on a test flight to determine the horizontal distance required to land and bring the A/C to a complete stop as required by 14 CFR 25.125.  NTSB Report #:  NTSB-AAR-82-2 dated 2/9/1982.

• August 1980:  The DC-9-80 was certified by the FAA.
• September 13, 1980:  swissair took delivery of the first DC-9-80.
• October 1980:  DC-9-80 enters service with swissair.
• January 8, 1981:  First flight of the DC-9-82.
• August 1981:  The first DC-9-82 enters service with Republic Airlines.

• November 1982:  A new designation system for McDonnell Douglas commercial aircraft combines the “M” of McDonnell and the “D” of Douglas.  The first aircraft to use the new designation was the DC-9-80 which became known as the MD-80.
• April 18, 1983:  TWA took delivery of its first MD-80, an MD82.
• May 12, 1983:  American Airlines’ first MD-82 delivered…N203AA.

• February 29, 1984:  American Airlines places the largest single aircraft purchase order in U.S. aviation history at the time when it ordered 67 MD-82s with options for 100 more.
• December 17, 1984:  First flight of the MD-83.
• February 1985:  The first MD-83 enters service with Alaska Airlines.
• December 4, 1986:  First flight of the MD-87.
• June 3, 1987:  American Airlines’ first MD-83 delivered…N562AA.
• November 1987:  The first MD-87 enters service with FinnAir.
• August 15, 1987:  First flight of the MD-88.
• January 1988:  The first MD-88 enters service with Delta Air Lines.
• November 14, 1989:  MD-90 program launched when Delta Air Lines orders 50 MD-90s with options for 110 more.
• February 22, 1993:  First flight of the MD-90.
• February 1995:  First MD-90 delivered to Delta Air Lines
• October 1995: The MD-95 program is launched with it’s first order.  The aircraft is later renamed the B717 after the Boeing merger in 1997.
• August 1, 1997:  McDonnell Douglas and Boeing merge.

• December 21, 1999:  TWA takes delivery of the last MD-80 to come off the Boeing MD-80 production line.

·         McDonnell Douglas and Boeing delivered 1,194 MD-80s from 1980 to 1999.

·         At one time, American Airlines owned 325 MD-80 series aircraft.  Although they are currently retiring the MD-82/83 at the rate of 2 per month, American is still the largest DC-9 / MD-80 operator in the world.

N237AA, an MD-82, in the Roswell, New Mexico graveyard

American Airlines MD82s in the Roswell, New Mexico graveyard

There were a total of 2,442 DC-9, MD-80 and B717 series aircraft produced…611 more than the Boeing 727 series aircraft!

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An Airline Pilot Checkride

I crawled into the cockpit, ducked my head to avoid scraping my bald head on the minefield that is the overhead panel and set my kitbag in the space designed for it next to my seat.  As I sunk into my sheep-skin covered seat and began building my “nest”, I looked up at the instrument panel and couldn’t help noticing how everything looked, felt and smelled normal.  Just another flight.  We were on the ground in Memphis, Tennessee and the terminal was clearly in view out the window.  The large, back-lit sign on the jetbridge read C12…news to me since I had entered the cockpit by way of the Flight Training Center, not the airport terminal.

Flight 611 from Memphis to Dallas was actually going to take place in a simulator on day four of my recurrent training assignment.  I return to the Flight Academy once every nine months to get one of two different training routines.  Nine months ago, while completing a three day training event, I got one full day in the classroom followed by two days in the sim.  The first, a day of training with one of our instructors.  The second, a checkride during which a check-airman thoroughly probed my abilities as an aviator. 

Nine months ago, I was tested on my ability to fly every type of approach I’m qualified to perform and refreshed my skills at handling a number of emergencies as well.  Time and distance were not factors as the instructor could place me outside the outer marker for the ILS approach to runway 28 in Chicago and five minutes later set me up to intercept the final approach course for an RNAV approach in Dallas.  The seasons could be changed faster than anything in real life allowing us to fly a heavy weight departure out of Denver at 100 degrees Fahrenheit followed by an icy winter approach and landing in New York a few minutes later. 

This month’s training event took one day longer than the routine I completed nine months ago, adding a day of classroom study to the schedule.  This time around the classes were designed to refresh my memory of aircraft systems, flight manuals, regulations, safety, security and human factors.  Day three took place in the simulator and looked remarkably similar to my first day in the sim 9 months ago with a thorough review of normal and abnormal procedures.

Today, day four of my current training cycle, was different than anything I did nine months ago.  Flight 611 was going to take place in real time.  Commonly referred to as a LOFT, or Line Oriented Flight Training, the purpose of today’s flight was to observe a real flight, in real time, with no outside help or influence not normally available to the flight crew.  Something was going to go wrong.  I didn’t know what and I didn’t know when, but I knew it was coming.  I would have to handle the situation as I would in real life and I would be graded on my performance and held responsible for the outcome. 

As I got comfortable, the check-airman sitting behind me took on the role the world outside the cockpit.  He would be the gate agent, flight attendant, push crew, ramp controller, ground, tower, departure and en-route controller and anyone else we needed to be in contact with during our flight.  What he would not be was an instructor.  During a normal training exercise in the simulator, it isn’t at all uncommon for the instructor to hit pause and carry on a conversation with the pilots as the aircraft is suspended in a moment of time.  Finish teaching, hit play, and let things start where they left off.  There would be none of that today.

The normal pressures of an every-day flight started about 5 minutes in as the instructor…excuse me…as the gate agent began pushing for an on-time departure that had been intentionally and unreasonably set by the instructor.  This really was going to feel real.  The Captain and I had to make a conscious effort to slow things down and do things right the first time.  You rarely get an opportunity for a do-over in aviation.

With the cockpit prepped and ready for departure and the simulator door closed behind us, I heard a high pitched beep from outside the sim warning anyone within a few hundred feet that the simulator’s draw-bridge style walkway was about to raise.  Shortly thereafter I felt the sim begin to move as the motion system was engaged.  From here on, everything would look and feel real.

The interphone crackled as the Crew Chief advised the Captain that the walk around and FOD check (Foreign Object Debris) was complete and gave him clearance to release brakes and call for push-back.  “Memphis Ground, American 611, C12, Push-back.” 

We pushed back from the gate, started both engines and began our taxi to runway 18C with visibility reported at 2400 RVR (Runway Visual Range).  Honestly, I was a little surprised it wasn’t lower.  Anything less than 1800 RVR and we would need a takeoff alternate, since we would need at least that much to return to Memphis in the event of an engine failure.  Instructors like to set the visibility below single engine minimums to see if you will pick up on the fact that you are legally required to have a take-off alternate.  It's a common gotcha, but as I said, would not be a factor today.

As we approached runway 18C, the tower controller cleared us to “Line up and wait” but I was not ready for takeoff.  Given the visibility, I didn’t want to be “heads down” while taxiing around a relatively unfamiliar airport and had gotten behind on the Taxi and Before Takeoff checklists.  I still needed to compare our final closeout weight and balance information against the planned numbers and had a few checklist items to complete before we would be ready to depart.  Once I was finished, I advised the tower that we were ready and we promptly received clearance for takeoff.  “Fly runway heading, Runway 18C…cleared for takeoff.”

The Captain had elected to fly the leg, which most likely meant I would be running the checklists and solving problems as they arose.  We accelerated down the runway, rotated and climbed into the cloud filled night sky.  We were almost instantly inside the clouds with two white beams of light emanating from each wing tip illuminating the dense cloud cover ahead.

The departure controller turned us to the west, and as we climbed through 10,000 feet, handed us off to Memphis Center.  Soon thereafter we were cleared on course direct to the Little Rock VOR where we would pick up the arrival into Dallas. 

As I mentioned before, one thing that set this flight off as different from most others was that I knew something bad was coming.  Again, I didn’t know what or when, but I knew it was coming.  I scanned the engine instruments and the overhead panel with much more frequency than normal in hopes of catching some sign of what was to come.  Nothing seemed out of place.  Everything was working perfectly.

We leveled off at FL 320 (32,000 ft.) and completed the Cruise checklist, sent a position report to our company dispatcher (who was still seated 2 feet behind me) and started planning our descent and arrival into Dallas.  The weather in Dallas was worse than it was in Memphis with RVR 800/600/400 (touchdown, mid, rollout) reported on runway 17C.  Visibility this low would necessitate a CAT III approach and an autopilot flown landing known as an autoland.

The MD80, as old as it is, does a respectable job landing itself on the centerline and coming to a complete stop without any assistance from the pilot except the manual inputs it took to set up the procedure.  300 – 200 – 100 – the jet announces 50 feet as the throttles retard on their own and the control yoke pulls back to raise the nose.  40 – 30 – 20 – 10 – and the jet settles onto the runway.  The landing isn’t always the type that encourages the pilot to stand in the doorway and take bows, but all things considered, especially the jet’s 1960’s heritage, it’s impressive to watch.

Still level at FL 320, I had just requested an ATIS (Automatic Terminal Information System) for Dallas and sent a request for gate arrival and connecting gate information when a yellow “CAUTION” light illuminated on the glare shield.  “Here we go” I thought.  I looked up to see the “L CSD OIL PRESS LOW” light illuminated on the anunciator panel.  No other light accompanied this lone warning light.  I was surprised by that and expected the left generator to fail at any moment.  At the Captain’s command, I retrieved my QRH (Quick Reference Handbook) and found the appropriate checklist.  About two minutes later as I was working my way through the checklist, the “CAUTION” light again caught my attention.  I looked up and noticed that the “L GEN OFF” light had also illuminated. 

With the Captain’s consent, I reached for the APU start switch and hoped that the good ole Auxiliary Power Unit would spool up in this cold thin air.  I was a little surprised to see it come to life and even more surprised to see a blue power available light shortly thereafter.  This was shaping up to be much easier than I expected.

A little explanation may be in order here…Each engine-driven generator is driven through a constant-speed drive known as a CSD.  The CSD converts the variable speed output of the engine driven generator to a constant speed.  The output of the generator is variable because it is connected to the engine and changes speed as the speed of the engine is adjusted by the pilot.  The CSD is lubricated by oil and is monitored by a fault protection system in each generator control circuit that automatically removes the generator from its bus and de-energize the generator in the event of certain malfunctions.

We continued with the checklist and disconnected the CSD to prevent any damage to the engine or generator.

Checklist complete. 

The question at this point, and another gotcha, was the legality of flying a CAT III approach and an autoland with a compromised electrical system.  I looked up a chart in the Aircraft Flight Manual that listed all equipment required to fly the approach.  Under electrical system, the chart simply read “Normal**” Hmm…what do the two stars mean?  At the bottom of the page in small print it read ”**APU may be used in lieu of one engine generator.”  So in our case, a disconnected CSD and an inoperative engine driven generator was normal as long as the APU generator was operating normally.

The rest was simple and quite routine.  I checked and rechecked the book a few times just to make sure I was reading it correctly since illegally flying a CAT III approach would most definitely end the ride with a pink slip, but we were in fact legal.

After we landed, we were given taxi instructions to the terminal where we shut down and completed the Parking checklist.  “Nice job gentlemen, ride’s over.”  Those were nice words to hear…except it wasn’t really over.

The LOFT part of the checkride is what we call a “jeopardy” ride.  Although it rarely happens, you can fail the ride.  If you don’t pass, you come back for more training and do it all over again on another day.  The rest of the ride would be “train to proficiency.”  During a “train to proficiency” event, you are permitted to re-attempt a maneuver if you screw it up the first time.  The only limiting factor is that there are a number of items that must be demonstrated and if you run out of time because you did everything twice, then you won’t be able to finish in the allotted time and another day of training would be in order. 

...if you don't think you have time to do it right the first time, what makes you think you have time to do it twice?

After a short break in the “iron kitchen” we climbed back into the simulator and took a beating from the check-airman.  Wind shear on takeoff…twice.  Wind shear during the landing phase…twice.  Twice, not because we didn’t do it right the first time, but because the instructor wanted us to see the outcome of using different techniques for escape.  High and low speed aborts…engine failures at critical speeds…several engine fires...a cargo fire…several approaches…unusual attitude recovery...RNAV procedures and some raw data time in the pattern. 

Raw data?  That means we flew around in the clouds with no autopilot and no flight director.  Sounds simple enough, but if you rely too much on the autopilot as many do, it can be surprisingly difficult.  We flew around for a while getting climbs, descents and turns then flew a raw data ILS to minimums with a direct crosswind at 18 knots gusting to 23.  It wasn’t the prettiest approach I’d ever flown, but I was pleased to have kept everything within the required standards.

Day four of my training consisted of a two hour oral exam and pre-flight brief followed by four hours in the simulator.  I walked away feeling refreshed and confident in my skills.  There’s nothing quite like the feeling a pilot has while walking away from the school house after a successful checkride.  Back to guilt free TV, good books and long walks on layovers. 

I’ll be back for more in another nine months.

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